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  • 自由主义

    Libertarianism
    ::自由主义

    lesson content

     

    Human beings are free to choose among alternatives available and must be respected as such. This freedom is to be acknowledged and promoted . The believers in free will attempt to argue for their case against those that believe that all human actions are determined by previous events and the laws of the physical universe.
    ::人类可以自由选择可供选择的替代方法,必须尊重这种自由,这种自由应得到承认和促进,信徒们将自由争取反对那些认为人类的一切行动都由以往的事件和自然界的法律决定的人。

    Below are several arguments in support of the Libertarian position.
    ::以下是支持自由主义立场的若干论点。

    The libertarians would ask that we consider the data of experience: 
    ::自由主义者要求我们考虑经验数据:

    1. Experience of deliberation
      ::审议经验的经验
    2. I deliberate only about my behavior
      ::我只考虑我的行为
    3. I deliberate only about future things
      ::我只考虑未来的事情
    4. I cannot deliberate about what I shall do, if I already know what I am going to do
      ::我不能考虑我该怎么办,如果我已经知道我要做什么
    5. I cannot deliberate unless I believe that it is "up to me"
      ::除非我相信这是"由我决定" 否则我无法深思熟虑
    6. Experience that it is "up to me" what to do
      ::经验是"由我决定"该做什么

    They hold that there is no necessity governing human behavior.  There is no causal or logical necessity
    ::他们认为,没有必要制约人类行为,没有因果关系或逻辑必要性。

    Do we really have free will?
    ::我们真的有自由意志吗?

     

    Libertarian  data to which any theory must conform.
    ::任何理论都必须符合的自由数据。

    Libertarians propose  the following method for finding out whether or not determinism is true: we try to see whether it is consistent with certain data, “that is, by seeing whether or not it squares with certain things that everyone knows, or believes himself to know, or with things everyone is at least more sure about than the answer to the question at issue.” 
    ::自由主义者提出以下方法来查明确定论是否属实:我们试图看看它是否与某些数据相一致,“也就是说,通过观察它是否与某些每个人都知道或相信自己知道的事情,或者与每个人至少比所争论的问题答案更肯定的事情有关。 ”

    Libertarian's   Data
    ::自由数据

    1. I sometimes deliberate with the view to making a decision; a decision, to do this thing or that.
      ::我有时会考虑做决定 做决定 做决定 做决定
    2. Whether or not I  deliberate about what to do, it is sometimes up to me what I do.
      1. By “deliberation” Taylor means the experience of weighing something in one’s mind, of trying out various options in one’s mind.
        ::泰勒(Taylor)的“评议”是指在思考中权衡某事、在思考中尝试各种选择的经验。

      ::不论我是否考虑要做什么,有时我应该做什么。 “深思熟虑 ” , 泰勒的意思是权衡一个人脑中的东西,尝试一个人脑中的各种选择。
    3. There are certain presuppositions of deliberation, namely,
      1. I  can deliberate only about my own behavior and never about the behavior of another.
        ::我只能考虑我自己的行为 而不是别人的行为
      2. I  can deliberate only about future things, never about things past or present.
        ::我只能考虑未来的事情 永远不考虑过去和现在的事情
      3. I  can’t deliberate about what I’m going to do if I already know what I’m going to do.
        ::如果我已经知道自己要做什么, 我无法考虑我下一步要做什么。
      4. I can’t deliberate about what to do, even though I  may not know what I’m going to do, unless I  believe that it is up to me what I’m going to do.
        ::我无法思考该怎么办, 即使我可能不知道自己要做什么, 除非我相信我该做什么。

      ::有一些预想的考虑,即,我只能考虑我自己的行为,而从来没有考虑别人的行为。我只能考虑未来的事情,从不考虑过去或现在的事情。如果我已经知道自己要做什么,我就不能考虑我下一步要做什么。我不能考虑该怎么办,尽管我可能不知道自己要做什么,除非我相信我该做什么。

    This data is  not consistent with the thesis of Determinism . If D eterminism is true, then it is an illusion that I ever genuinely deliberate about anything or that anything is ever really up to me. If these data are true, then D eterminism is false. Taylor argues that it doesn’t make any difference whether we are talking about a forthright,  Hard Determinism  or a Compatibil ist , “soft” determinism , like that of H ume. According to “soft” determinism, an action is free just so long as it is caused by an internal state of the agent himself or herself.
    ::这些数据与确定论的理论不符。 如果确定论是真实的,那么它就是一种幻想,即我曾经真正审议过任何事情,或者任何事情都由我决定。 如果这些数据是真实的,那么确定论就是虚假的。 泰勒认为,无论我们谈论的是直截了当的、硬的确定论还是像休姆那样的兼容论、“软的”确定论,这都没有任何区别。 根据“软的”确定论,只要行动是由代理人本人或本人的内部状态引起的,那么行动就是自由的。

    Against this, there is the  counterexample  of an ingenious physiologis t who can induce in a subject any volition he pleases, so that, simply by pushing a button, he can cause the subject to have an internal state which the subject will experience as the desire to do a certain thing. If the subject then does that thing, unimpeded by any external obstacle , that action meets the criterion of being a “free” action, in accordance with the thesis of  Soft Determinism .
    ::与此相反的是,有一位天才生理学家的反证,他可以在一个主题中诱发他喜欢的任何主动性,这样,只要按下按钮,他就可以使主题具有一个内部状态,而主题人将体验到做某件事的愿望。 如果主体这样做,不受任何外部障碍的阻碍,那么按照软决定主义的理论,该行为就符合“自由”行动的标准。

    That is, the action is due to an internal state of the agent and is not opposed by any external factor.
    ::也就是说,这一行动是由于代理人的内部状态造成的,不受任何外部因素的反对。

    However, we see at once that this action is not free, because it was due to the subject’s being in a certain internal state over which he or she had no control. Then the supposition of the work of the ingenious physiologist isn't necessary to reach the same conclusion.  As long as there is any cause of the internal state that was not under the control of the person whose internal state it is, the resulting action is not free.
    ::然而,我们同时看到,这一行动并非免费,因为它是由于主体处于一个他或她无法控制的内部状态。 然后,聪明的生理学家的工作假设就没有必要得出同样的结论了。 只要内部状态有任何原因不在内部状态控制之下,那么由此产生的行动就不是自由的。

    There is a real choice that is not to be evaded between accepting D eterminism and rejecting the data with which we began, on the one hand or holding fast to our data and rejecting the thesis which is inconsistent with them. However, simply rejecting D eterminism and embracing the thesis of simple Indeterminism , which says that some events are uncaused, brings us no closer to a theory explaining free actions that is consistent with our data. Imagine a case in which your right  arm is free, according to this conception. That is, it just moves one way or another, without any cause whatever. Plainly, if the agent is not the cause for the arm movements, then those movements are not free voluntary actions of the agent.
    ::在接受确定论和拒绝我们开始使用的数据之间,有一个真正的选择是不可回避的,一方面是接受确定论,一方面是拒绝我们开始使用的数据,另一方面则拒绝与数据不一致的理论。然而,简单地拒绝确定论,接受简单的非决定性论的理论,即有些事件是没有原因的,使我们无法更接近于解释与我们的数据一致的自由行动的理论。想象一下,根据这个概念,你的右臂是自由的。也就是说,它只是以某种方式移动,没有任何原因。 显而易见,如果代理人不是武器运动的起因,那么这些运动不是代理人自由自愿行动。

    A ccordingly, there develops a theory of agency with the following elements:
    ::因此,形成了一种机构理论,其要素如下:

    1.  An action that is free must be caused by the agent who performs it, and it must be such that no other set of antecedent conditions was sufficient for the occurrence of just that action.
      ::自由的行为必须由实施该行为的代理人引起,而且必须使任何其他一系列先前的条件都不足以仅仅发生该行为。
    2. An agent is a self or person, and not merely a collection of things or events, but a self-moving being.
      ::代理人是自我或人,不仅仅是事物或事件的集合,而是自我移动的人。

    This involves a metaphysical commitment to a special kind of causation, and suggests that perhaps “causation” is not the best language to use to describe it. We might want to say instead that an agent originates, initiates, or simply, performs an action.  All other cases of causation we conceive of as a relation between events. One event or set of events is a sufficient, or necessary, or sufficient and necessary condition for the occurrence of another.
    ::这涉及对某种特殊因果关系的形体承诺,并表明也许“因果关系”不是用来描述它的最佳语言。我们不妨说,一个代理人起源、发起或简单地采取行动。我们认为所有其他因果关系都是事件之间的关系。一个事件或一系列事件是另一个事件的发生的充分、必要或必要条件,或足够和必要的条件。

    However, an agent is not an event, and we certainly wouldn’t say the mere existence of the agent is ever a sufficient condition for the occurrence of one of his or her free actions. Rather, it is only the free action of the agent that is the cause or the origination of the action. Since There is  no further explanation of how it that this occurs and it is possible that the data that this theory was developed to explain might be an illusion after all, ending on an inconclusive note.
    ::然而,代理人不是一个事件,我们当然不会说,代理人的存在本身是发生其自由行动的充足条件。 相反,只有代理人的自由行动才是行动的原因或起源。 因为没有进一步解释这种情况是如何发生的,因此,这一理论所解释的数据有可能毕竟是一种幻觉,最后只能是没有结论的音符。

    The idea of freedom operative in this view is one in which there is no obstacle or impediment that prevents behavior, no constraints, for it is constraints that force behavior. Freedom of the human agent is free activity that is unimpeded and unconstrained. So, there is the theory of agency in which there exist self-determining beings: free and rational.  There exists the self or person, a substance and self-moving being. The L ibertarians believe that this theory is consistent with the data of human consciousness. But that data may be illusion.
    ::在这种观点中,自由运作的概念是没有障碍或障碍来阻止行为,没有限制,因为制约是迫使行为的行为。 人的自由是不受阻碍和不受限制的自由活动。 因此,有一种机构理论是存在自我确定的人:自由和理性的。存在自我或人、物质和自我运动。自由主义者认为这一理论符合人类意识的数据。但这些数据可能是幻觉。

        Summary of Taylor's view  by Omonia Vinieris (QCC, 2002)
    ::Omoonia Vinnieris(QCC,2002年)对泰勒意见的概述

    In his work, A Contemporary Defense of Free Will, Taylor refutes the theories held by Compatibilism (Soft Determinism) and Simple Indeterminism to illustrate their implausibility.  He further goes on to affirm his theory of agency to articulate his Libertarian standpoint.
    ::泰勒在《当代捍卫自由意志》的著作中驳斥了兼容论(Soft decidminism)和简单非定论所持有的理论,以说明这些理论的不可信性。 泰勒还进一步确认了他阐述其自由立场的机构理论。

    Taylor clarifies the concept of deliberation as it is fundamentally the act of considering or assessing something in one’s mind.  According to Taylor, deliberation encompasses the following premises: "One can deliberate solely about one’s own conduct and by no means about that of another due to the simple fact that each person makes up one’s own mind and never the mind of a different person."  There is only deliberation of future actions and never of precedent ones because one can not deliberate about or consider an action that has already transpired.  Deliberation is a conditional state that is unconfirmed because it entails the action before it takes place and therefore if one knows or confirms a future action, deliberation is invalid.  Altogether, deliberation itself does not exist or ensue if one does not even believe that it is ever one’s own consideration that accounts for one’s decision to do anything because that is essentially the principle that deliberation embraces. 
    ::泰勒(Taylor)澄清了审议的概念,因为它从根本上讲是考虑或评估某人头脑中某事的行为。 泰勒(Taylor)认为,审议包含以下前提:“一个人可以仅仅考虑一个人自己的行为,而不会考虑另一个人的行为,因为每个人的心思都是由一个人自己决定的,而从来就不是另一个人的心思。 ”只有审议未来的行动,从来就没有先例,因为人们不能审议或考虑已经发生的行动。 解放是一个条件性国家,它未经证实,因为它涉及在它发生之前采取的行动,因此,如果一个人知道或确认未来的行动,审议是无效的。 总的来说,审议本身不存在,如果人们甚至不认为它永远是一个人自己的考虑而决定做任何事情,因为基本上就是审议所包括的原则。

    In his critique of Soft Determinism, Taylor explains primarily what line of reasoning it maintains and then pinpoints its incongruity to negate its veracity.  Compatibilism is a position whose advocates renounce Hard Determinist thought.  Hard Determinist position asserts that we are not morally responsible for our own actions because we are not liable for anything we do.  Yet, Soft Determinists say that freedom and Determinism are compatible.   Determinism is plausibly coherent with freedom as an agent is a carrier of volition and acts appropriately to his or her desires and wishes.  On occasion, it may be that one’s actions are the product of one’s deliberation or conditional forethought.  Still, if Compatibilism holds true it must simultaneously maintain the Determinist idea that one’s choices are preordained by prenatal events. If this is so, then how can it be possibly up to anyone to do anything?
    ::泰勒在其对软决定论的批评中,主要解释了它所坚持的推理路线,然后指出其不兼容性来否定其真实性。 兼容主义是一个主张放弃硬决定主义思想的立场。 硬决定主义的立场声称,我们在道义上不对我们自己的行动负责,因为我们不承担任何责任。 然而,软决定主义者说,自由和确定主义是兼容的。 软决定主义与自由是完全一致的。 作为代理人的自由是自愿的载体,其行为符合他或她的愿望和愿望。 有时,一个人的行为可能是一个人的思考或有条件的思考的产物。 尽管如此,如果兼容主义是真实的,它必须同时保持决定主义的理念,即一个人的选择是由产前事件预设的。 如果是这样的话,那又怎么能让任何人做任何事情呢?

    Simple Indeterminism is the denial of Determinism.  These Indeterminists affirm that free agents are morally responsible for their actions which are tamed and controlled.  If actions originate from noncausal events as Indeterminists claim, then they are chaotic and untamed.  Thus, Taylor considers it a contradiction to suggest that one’s actions originate from uncaused events because neither is one really a free agent nor morally responsible for his or her actions.  These actions are uncontrollable and irresponsible.
    ::简单的非决定性主义就是否认决定性主义。 这些非决定性主义者肯定自由代理人对其被驯服和控制的行为负有道德责任。 如果行为是非因果关系事件引发的,正如非决定性主义者所宣称的那样,那么它们就是混乱和无争议的。 因此,泰勒认为认为,认为一个人的行为源自无缘事件的说法是自相矛盾的,因为一个人既不是一个真正的自由代理人,也不对他或她的行为承担道德责任。 这些行动是不可控制和不负责任的。

    Taylor’s theory of agency proclaims that all events are caused, but unlike Determinist Theory, some changes or actions have beginnings.  A free action is triggered by the agent itself.  An agent, in this case, is described as a human, a self-moving body, capable of being the first cause of motion in a causal sequence.  It is important that no series of foregoing conditions is adequate for the actual happening of the action, otherwise it would not be free.  He further specifies that we should not speak of causation in terms of his free agency.  The agent, rather, initiates an action through its performance.  An agent, he asserts, is not a set of events that executes causation and therefore it is the free action of the agent that is the cause of the action that occurred.
    ::泰勒的代理理论宣称,所有事件都是起因,但与决定性论理论不同,有些变化或行动已经开始。 代理人本身引发了自由行动。 在本案中,代理人被描述为人类,一个自我移动的身体,能够成为因果序列中第一个行动的原因。 重要的是,任何上述一系列条件都不能满足实际行动的实际发生,否则它不会是自由的。 他进一步明确指出,我们不应该用自由机构来谈论因果关系。 代理人通过表现来发起行动。 他声称,代理人不是一系列执行因果关系的事件,因此,发生行动的原因是代理人的自由行动。

    “In the case of an action that is free, it must be such that it is caused by the agent who performs it, but such that no antecedent conditions were sufficient for his performing just that action.”
    ::“在自由诉讼的情况下,必须是由实施该诉讼的代理人造成的,但没有任何先决条件足以使该代理人仅仅执行该诉讼。”

        John Searle on Free Will (2001)
    ::自由意志约翰·西尔(2001年)

    The Freewill Problem:
    ::自由意志问题:

    1. The ‘free will’ problem:
      ::`自由意志 ' 问题:
    2. What is the nature of free agency and how is it related to the conditions of responsible behaviour?
      ::自由代理的性质是什么? 它与负责任行为的条件有何关系?
    3. For instance, is the kind freedom that is necessary for moral responsibility freedom of the will, of the agent, of the agent’s deliberations, of the agent’s choices, or of the agent’s actions?
      ::例如,对于道德责任自由所必要的那种自由,即代理人的意志、代理人的审议、代理人的选择或代理人的行动的自由?
    4. Incompatibilism.
      ::不兼容主义。
    5. Incompatibilism is the view that the kind of freedom necessary for moral responsibility is inconsistent (incompatible) with the truth of determinism.
      ::不兼容的观点认为,道德责任所必要的那种自由与确定主义的真理不一致(不相容)。
    6. Incompatibilists form two camps: the Hard Determinists and the Libertarians.
      ::不兼容者形成两个阵营:硬决定因素主义者和自由主义者。
    7. Hard Determinists argue that since Determinism is true, it follows that there is no freedom and no moral responsibility.
      ::确定论者认为,既然确定论是真实的,那么就没有自由,也没有道德责任。
    8. Libertarians argue that since we are both free and responsible, Determinism must be false.
      ::自由主义者认为,既然我们既是自由的,也是负责任的,确定论必须是虚假的。
    9. Incompatibilists generally hold that the kind of freedom necessary for moral responsibility is some kind of freedom of the will.
      ::不兼容的人普遍认为,道德责任所必须的自由是某种意志的自由。
    10. However, Incompatibilists generally find it difficult to explain what is meant by the notion of freedom of the will.
      ::然而,不兼容的人一般认为很难解释意志自由的概念的含义。

    Compatibilism
    ::兼容主义

    1. Compatibilism is the view that the kind of freedom necessary for moral responsibility is consistent (compatible) with the truth of Determinism.
      ::兼容主义认为,道德责任所必要的那种自由符合(符合)确定论的真理。
    2. Compatibilists generally hold that the kind of freedom necessary for moral responsibility is some kind of freedom of choice or freedom of deliberation.
      ::兼容者普遍认为,道德责任所必需的自由是某种选择自由或审议自由。
    3. Compatibilists generally appeal to the social efficacy of our blaming practices in regulating behavior in order to explain why this kind of freedom is sufficient for moral justification. However, social efficacy does not seem to be sufficient for moral justification as a socially efficacious practice may be morally unjust.
      ::兼容者一般都呼吁我们在规范行为方面责怪行为的做法的社会效率,以便解释为什么这种自由足以为道德辩护。 但是,社会效率似乎不足以作为社会有效做法的道德理由,这在道德上可能是不公正的。

    Searle’s Solution to the Freewill Problem:
    ::席尔勒对自由意志问题的解决方案:

    The traditional debate conflates 2 problems:
    ::传统辩论把两个问题混为一谈:

    The question of the sort of freedom that is necessary for moral responsibility. The question of whether or not our actions are causally determined by their antecedents.
    ::道德责任所必须的那种自由问题,我们的行动是否由它们的前身决定的问题,是因果决定的。

    Consider the following situation:
    ::审议下列情况:

    • Agent A must choose between 2 options 01 and 02 at time T1.
      ::A剂必须在T1时的2个选项 01和02之间做出选择。
    • A chooses 01 and acts accordingly.
      ::选择 01 并相应采取行动。

    A’s action begins at T2 and ends at T3. Let us suppose that there is no time gap between T1 and T2, and that A’s action was voluntary (in the normal sense).
    ::A的行动始于T2, 止于T3。 让我们假设T1和T2之间没有时间间隔,A的行动是自愿的(通常意义上的 ) 。

    There are 2 ways in which the brain might function in this situation (2 solutions to the freewill problem):
    ::在这种情形下,大脑有两种运作方式(两种自由意志问题的解决办法):

    1. The state of the brain at T1 was causally sufficient to determine the state of the brain at T2, and the state of the brain at T2 was sufficient to carry it over to T3. The psychologically real gap corresponds to no neurobiological reality.
      ::T1的大脑状态因果足以确定T2的大脑状态,而T2的大脑状态足以将其结转到T3。 心理上的实际差距与神经生物学现实无关。
    2. The state of the brain at T1 was not causally sufficient to determine the state of the brain at T2, and so forth. The psychologically real gap does correspond to some neurobiological reality.
      ::T1的大脑状态因果不足以确定T2等的大脑状态。 心理上的实际差距与某些神经生物学现实相符。

    Position A is the Compatibilist position: Psychological Libertarianism with Physiological Determinism. This position is implausible because, whilst it is based on an attractively simple picture of the brain, it makes the psychological processes of rational decision-making into a very biologically expensive Epiphenomenal illusion.  Rational decision-making is useless because everything has already been determined in the brain.
    ::A是兼容论的立场:心理自由主义与生理决定因素主义。 这一立场是不可思议的,因为虽然它基于一个吸引人的简单大脑图象,但它使理性决策的心理过程变成一种非常昂贵的生物学上昂贵的Epipenomomine假象。 理性决策是无用的,因为大脑已经决定了一切。

    Position B is more plausible but needs to be carefully stated. If stated in the form of a parallelogram, it gives a misleading picture of the relation between consciousness and the brain. This picture suggest that consciousness is a surface feature of the brain. It is not, it is a system feature in the same way that liquidity is a system feature of water. The whole system is conscious and the whole system moves towards a rational decision.
    ::B 位置更合理,但需要谨慎说明。如果以平行图的形式表示,它会误导意识和大脑之间的关系。该图显示意识是大脑的表面特征。它不是,它是一个系统特征,与流动资金是水的系统特征相同。整个系统都是有意识的,整个系统都朝着理性的决定方向前进。

    Conscious states can act causally in a way that affects neurobiological elements of the system of which is they are a systemic feature. This is similar to Sperry’s wheel example: consider any single molecule in a rolling wheel.  The movements of the wheel may determine the movements of the molecule even though the wheel is nothing more than a collection of such molecules. The principle difference between the wheel and the conscious brain is that the movements of the former are causally determined whereas the movements of the latter are not.
    ::感知状态可以以影响系统神经生物元素的方式产生因果作用,而神经生物元素是系统特征。 这类似于斯培里的轮式样板:在滚动轮中考虑任何单分子。 轮的移动可以决定分子的移动,即使轮子只是这种分子的集合。 轮子和自觉大脑之间的主要区别在于前者的移动是因果决定的,而后者的移动则不是。

    The conscious state of the brain at any given time is completely fixed by its neurobiology at that time.  However, the conscious state of the brain at one time is not completely fixed by its neurobiology at another time. This gap can be explained by appeal to the self.
    ::大脑在任何特定时间的自觉状态完全由当时的神经生物学决定。然而,大脑在某一时间的自觉状态并不是由神经生物学在另一时间完全决定的。这一差距可以用对自身的吸引力来解释。

    This position becomes more plausible if you think of quantum mechanics (after all, there’s no reason why we should stop at the level of neurobiology). Total Determinism is not needed to make the universe intelligible.  At the quantum level, the universe is not Determined.
    ::如果你想到量子力学(毕竟,我们没有理由停留在神经生物学层面 ) , 这个位置就更可信了。 完全的确定论并不需要让宇宙能够理解。 在量子层面,宇宙没有被确定。

    One possible criticism of position B is that it postulates randomness.
    ::对B立场的一个可能的批评是,它假定随机性。

    This criticism is unfounded. Rational agency is realized in the neurobiological structures of the brain and can causally affect those structures. Thus, the neurobiological structures are driven by the same rational agency as conscious agency.
    ::这种批评是没有根据的。 理性机构在大脑的神经生物结构中得以实现,并可能因果影响这些结构。 因此,神经生物结构是由与有意识机构相同的理性机构驱动的。

    John Searle on the Problem of Free Will
    ::John Searle 关于自由意志问题

     

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    EPISD Informed Problem Solvers
    ::EPISD EPISD 信息化解决问题者

     

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